

RESOLUTION

Subject: Statutory contributions

Following the proposal of the Executive Committee, which had taken note of the results of the attached study on the statutory contributions system, carried out on the basis of the General Assembly Resolution AGN/66/RES/13 adopted at its 66th session, meeting in New Delhi from 15th to 21st October 1997,

The ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Seoul from 8th to 12th November 1999 at its 68th session:

DECIDES to ask the Member States to consider the attached study and to forward their comments and suggestions to the General Secretariat by 1st May 2000 at the latest.

Adopted

STATUTORY CONTRIBUTION STUDY

(98/CE/3 Document No. 12)

Executive Summary:

Interpol was created to improve international police co-operation. The relationship between Interpol Headquarters and its member countries is symbiotic. International criminals and fugitives present a problem for all countries: the countries in which they operate; the countries from which they flee; and the countries to which they flee. Criminals will operate within the voids where international police co-operation is lacking to the detriment of all countries. This is particularly true for terrorists who can strike worldwide against a country whose businesses and citizens operate internationally. Thus, Interpol exists to help member countries fight crime domestically and internationally.

Interpol's ability to fulfill its mission depends on three related factors. First, Interpol's budget must adequately fund its mission. Second, the budget allocation among member countries must be sound and equitable to ensure the Organization's financial health and to reduce dissension within the Organization. Third, Interpol's effectiveness requires that member countries participate fully and meaningfully in its activities. It is a chain-like process: a sound and equitable budgetary scheme is linked to full and meaningful participation of its member countries which is linked to Organizational effectiveness.

This financial study did not analyze the adequacy of Interpol's existing budget; and the study's author was not asked to participate in the development of Interpol's strategic plan which must have budgetary implications. Instead, this study examined the soundness and equability of Interpol's current statutory contribution scheme based on existing assumptions. Within this framework, the study concludes that Interpol's existing budgetary scheme advantages Interpol's richest countries while disadvantaging Interpol's poorest countries. Such disparity undermines full and meaningful participation of member countries and therefore the overall effectiveness of the Organization. For these reasons, this study recommends that Interpol change its statutory contribution scheme.

Two options are offered for consideration. Both rely on the United Nations budgetary framework for rank ordering countries from richest to poorest and on the World Customs Organization's framework for determining the appropriate combined statutory contribution ceiling for Interpol's six richest countries. Both options increase the combined maximum statutory contribution of Interpol's six richest countries from 31.98% to 66.7% which matches exactly their percentage of the World Customs Organization's budget, but which is lower than their 71.77% contribution to the United Nations budget. Both options lower the individual minimum country statutory contribution of Interpol's poorest countries from .11% to .01%.

The differences between Options A and B are as follows:

Option A increases the statutory contributions of Interpol's six richest countries to 11.11% per country to satisfy 66.7% of Interpol's budget. These countries are: France, Germany, Japan, Italy, United Kingdom and United States. It also provides modest increases for six other countries (Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Republic of Korea, Mexico and Thailand). (See column for Option A).

Option B increases the statutory contributions of the United States and Japan to 20% each and increases three countries' (France, Germany, and Italy) statutory contributions proportional to their ability to pay in order to reach the 66.7% combined statutory contribution set forth in Option A. It also provides modest increases for four other countries (Spain, Brazil, Republic of Korea, and Thailand). The United Kingdom, Argentina and Mexico would have slight reductions. (See column for Option B)

This interim report is organized as follows: **Part I** restates the impetus for this study.

Part II highlights evidence reflecting the disproportionate impact of the Van Hove statutory contribution formula on Interpol's poorest countries. **Part III** lays out the Ten Guiding principles relied on by the Noble Study. **Part IV** sets forth supporting evidence for increasing the statutory contributions of Interpol's six wealthiest countries and for reducing the statutory contributions of Interpol's poorest countries. **Part V** proposes two options: Option A and Option B are set forth within a chart revealing the statutory contributions for member countries under each option and highlighting the countries whose statutory contributions would be increased. The Executive Committee may discuss and vote for Option A or Option B.

I. Impetus For Study:

Interpol suffered from a financial crisis several years ago when increasing numbers of member countries failed to pay their statutory contributions. The Organization responded by enforcing Article 52 sanctions. The imposition of Article 52 sanctions had four significant effects: First, it conveyed to member countries that Interpol considered it essential that statutory contributions be paid. Second, it implied that those countries suffering Article 52 sanctions were not paying dues that had been fairly assessed. Third, it deprived sanctioned member countries from voting on constitutional (and other) matters which created a perception of organizational paralysis. Fourth, it caused Article 52 countries to challenge as unfair both the amount of their statutory contribution obligations and the extent of Article 52 sanctions.

Like many conflicts, there are radically different views regarding the nature of Interpol's organizational health today. One can look at Interpol's overall budget and ask what percentage of that budget remains uncollected as a result of member countries that are in Article 52 status. The answer is 2%. It is difficult to get very worried about an organization's

inability to collect 2% of its budget. Even if one were to add the countries that are on the verge of Article 52 status, the total percentage of the budget that would remain uncollected would be less than 3%. So, from a percentage of budget collected perspective, Interpol's budgetary story sounds good.

However, if one looks at Interpol and its mission statement and asks what percentage of member countries are fully participating within the Organization, a completely different view about the health of the Organization emerges. Currently, there are approximately 25 countries in Article 52 status. As a result, 14% of Interpol's countries have been deprived from fully and meaningfully participating in the Organization's activities. These countries cannot present members for Executive Committee participation; they have limited voting rights and they may not fully participate in Interpol sponsored training conferences. If one adds the approximately nine countries that are on the verge of Article 52 status, the percentage of countries that could be prevented from full and meaningful participation in the Organization's activities increases to 20%. Thus, using member-country participation as the point of reference, Interpol's story does not sound that healthy.

II. Disproportionate Impact Of Interpol's Current Budget Structure On Poorest Countries:

A. The Van Hove Study created two categories of budget increases. A voluntary increase and a mandatory increase.

1. Voluntary Increase Category:

Any increases above two budget units were deemed voluntary. Thus, all countries that already were paying two or more budget units at the time of the Van Hove Study were free to reject any budget increases: they could remain at their previous level. It did not matter how great the disparity was between what they were supposed to pay and what they actually paid. 20 of the countries that fell into this category rejected any increase above what they were paying at the time of the Van Hove Study, while only four countries agreed to a partial increase. The countries that rejected in whole or in part the proposed budgetary increases represent 13% of member countries. These countries have rejected an increase of 159.4 budget units which accounts for 9% of Interpol's budget. However, because their increase was deemed voluntary, none of these countries has suffered Article 52 sanctions as a result of not paying the proposed increases.

2. Mandatory Increase Category:

The increase from one to two budget units was deemed mandatory. These countries had to pay the new two budget unit minimum or suffer Article 52 sanctions. There are 54 countries that fell into this category. As a whole, these countries represent 31% of

member countries but account only for 6% of Interpol's budget. There are 19 countries from this category that are currently in Article 52 status. They represent approximately 11% of Interpol's member countries while the uncollected annual budget amount owed by them accounts only for 2% of Interpol's budget.

B. Analysis of Van Hove Study's Impact on Member Countries:

The Van Hove Study's proposed contribution increases were intended to be based on member countries' ability to pay. If one assumes that this is right, then it is difficult to defend the current statutory-contribution allocation and sanctioning scheme. 24 countries in the voluntary group (13% of Interpol's membership) are being permitted not to pay 9% of Interpol's budget without Article 52 sanctions. However, 19 countries in the mandatory group (approximately 11% of Interpol's membership) are suffering Article 52 sanctions for not paying their required 2% of Interpol's budget. The disparate impact of the Van Hove Study on the poorest countries is extraordinary.

In fact, 64% of the twenty-five countries currently in Article 52 status (16 countries) are two budget unit countries.

It appears that at the time of the Van Hove Study no one considered the disparate impact of Article 52 sanctions on member countries. However, with hindsight, this study proposes that future budgetary increases be mandatory and that there be no differential treatment based on members' relative statutory contribution. Member countries of course may elect to make contributions above and beyond what they will be required to pay under the terms of this study.

III. Ten Guiding Principles For Noble Study:

The options contained in this study are based on the following ten principles:

One: Statutory contributions should be tied to Member Countries' comparative ability to pay.

Two: Payment of statutory contributions should be mandatory for all member countries.

Three: Statutory contributions should be based on objective criteria that are transparent and uncomplicated.

Four: Gross National Product and population should be considered valuable referent points in determining member countries' ability to pay.

Five: No country should pay so large a percentage of the Organization's budget that its refusal or failure to pay at any given time would disrupt the Organization's financial stability. Thus, there should be a ceiling for member countries' dues.

Six: A minimum level of contribution should be required from all countries to ensure a minimum level of commitment on their part. Thus, there should be a floor for member countries' dues.

Seven: Statutory contributions should be changed from budget units to a percentage of the Organization's budget. This will permit more precise dues assessments.

Eight: Individual member countries should be permitted to petition the Executive Committee for a change in their statutory contribution obligations in the event of force majeure occurrences.

Nine: It is in the best interests of Interpol to have all member countries fully and meaningfully participate in all aspects of the Organization's activities. This includes the right to vote on all matters; the right to propose candidates for all positions; the right to attend all training conferences and meetings; and the right to send and receive messages and notices to the Secretariat and National Central Bureaus.

Ten: Certain costs/benefits should not be included in determining the statutory contribution obligations of member countries.

- a. Countries should not be permitted to substitute individuals, services, or equipment in lieu of their statutory contribution obligations. The costs and benefits of these goods and services are simply too difficult and expensive to quantify and administer.
- b. Because the General Secretariat can provide no reliable way to measure the costs and benefits of a country's membership in the Organization, such speculative figures should not factor into determining member countries' statutory contributions.
- c. Similarly, there is no reliable way to quantify the costs and benefits to the host country where Interpol is or may one day be located. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that throughout the world, countries compete to have international institutions and businesses locate in their country because the benefits outweigh the costs. For purposes of this study, it would be a protracted and wasteful exercise to attempt to quantify the costs and benefits which flow from Interpol's being located in a particular host country for purposes of adjusting statutory contributions.

IV. Evidence Suggesting Interpol's Six Richest Countries Should Bear A Greater Portion Of Interpol's Budgetary Obligation:

A. Comparing Member Countries' Statutory Contributions Using Dollars Paid To Interpol Per Million Dollars Of GNP:

Interpol's six richest countries (United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy) contribute on average \$0.68 for every million dollars of GNP while Interpol's next six richest countries (Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia & Belgium) contribute \$2.04 for every million dollars of GNP. Thus, Interpol's six richest countries pay on average two-thirds less than Interpol's next six richest countries.

More strikingly, moving to six of Interpol's poorest countries (Sao Tome, Kiribati, Equatorial Guinea, Tonga, St. Kitts & Nevis & Dominica), one sees that these countries pay an average of \$255.92 to Interpol per million dollars of GNP. That amounts to 376 times the \$0.68 that Interpol's six richest countries pay. Furthermore, the poorest country pays 3,113 times more to Interpol per million dollars of GNP than the richest country pays. (See "Interpol Financial Data" charts distributed this summer)

Thus, using dollars paid to Interpol per million of dollars of GNP, Interpol's six richest countries can afford and should bear a larger percentage of Interpol's budgetary burden.

B. Comparing Member Countries' Statutory Contributions Using Per Capita Income:

The United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy have a combined average per capita income of \$27,263.52. GNP figures are not available for all of Interpol's countries; however, the combined average per capita income for the six countries with the lowest per capita income (Mozambique, Ethiopia, Chad, Burundi, Tanzania and Malawi) is \$143.41. Thus, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy have a combined average per capita income that is 190 times that of the countries with the lowest combined average per capita income. Furthermore, Interpol's highest member country's per capita income is 543 times greater than that of the lowest country's. Nonetheless, the difference between Interpol's highest dues' paying member and the lowest dues' paying member is only 50 times. (See "Interpol Financial Data" charts distributed this summer)

Thus, using per capita income, Interpol's six richest countries can afford and should bear a larger percentage of Interpol's budgetary burden.

C. Interpol's Budget Distribution Scheme Compared To Budget Schemes Of Other International Organizations.

The question of how much an individual country ought to contribute to Interpol is not a question that can be answered using objective data alone. As stated earlier, 25 of Interpol's countries are in Article 52 status for failing to pay their statutory contributions. The above objective data demonstrate that, within Interpol, the poorest countries are being asked to carry an extraordinarily high percentage of Interpol's burden relative to the Interpol's richest countries. What follows below examines what percentage of Interpol's budget is being carried by Interpol's six richest countries as compared to the percentage of other international organizations' budgets being carried by Interpol's six richest countries.

1. Comparison with the United Nations Model:

Under the Van Hove budgetary model, Interpol's six richest countries carry 31.984% of Interpol's budget. However these same six countries carry 71.77% of the U.N. budget for the budget year 2000.

2. Comparison with the World Customs Organization Model:

Under the Van Hove budgetary model Interpol's six richest countries carry 31.984% of Interpol's budget. However these same six countries carry 66.7% of the World Customs Organization budget for budget year 1997/1998.

By comparing the percentage of Interpol's debt borne by Interpol's six richest countries with the percentage of the UN's and WCO's debt borne by Interpol's six richest countries a great disparity can be seen. No rational basis has been articulated by the General Secretariat to explain why Interpol's six richest countries should bear such a comparatively small percentage of Interpol's budgetary burden.

V. Proposal: Option A or Option B:

Options A and B have been placed on the same chart to permit side-by-side comparisons. All countries whose statutory contributions would be increased under Options A or B have been highlighted

- A. Option A increases the statutory contributions of Interpol's six richest countries to 11.11% per country to satisfy 66.7% of Interpol's budget. These countries are: France, Germany, Japan, Italy, United Kingdom and United States. It also provides modest increases for six other countries (Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Republic of Korea, Mexico and Thailand). (See column for Option A).
- B. Option B increases the statutory contributions of the United States and Japan to 20% each and increases the remaining three countries' (France, Germany, and Italy) statutory contributions proportional to their ability to pay in order to reach the 66.7% combined statutory contribution set forth in Option A. It provides modest increases for four other countries (Spain, Brazil, Republic of Korea, and Thailand) while providing modest reductions for the United Kingdom, Argentina and Mexico. (See column for Option B).

The choice between Options A and B turns on whether Interpol wishes to spread the major portion of its financial debt among six countries or two countries and whether Interpol wishes to permit the U.S. and Japan to wield the de facto power that would accompany their providing 40% of Interpol's budget. The choice between Option A and Option B also depends on the willingness of the countries indicated above to increase their statutory contributions. It is the view of the author of this study that if Interpol can persuade them to accept Option A, it would be the preferred option because it spreads the financial risk and power over a wider range of countries. Otherwise Option B or some variation thereof would be required. In any event, discussions among the Executive Committee, the General Secretariat and the affected member countries will be necessary before Option A, Option B or a variation thereof can become final.

Appendix to be used in reading charts containing Options A and B:

Option A was created using the United Nations (“UN”) rank ordering and percentage assessment of each country's ability to pay, with two notable variations. The UN utilizes a system which emphasizes GNP and which in certain circumstances reduces dues for countries with particularly low Per Capita Incomes or substantially high debts. The first variation from the United Nations formula is that the minimum contribution in Option A has been set as 0.01% as opposed to 0.001%. This was done in recognition of the fact that Interpol operates on a considerably smaller budget than the UN, and if a country were to be assessed only 0.001% of the Interpol budget, its annual contribution would fall below the level of a token contribution. The second variation is that the six countries that are the largest contributors to Interpol were not assessed in accordance with the UN's model. Instead, the total combined percent contribution of these six countries to the World Customs Organization, which is currently 66.7%, was divided equally among these six countries. This was done in order to ensure a balance of power among the Organization's wealthiest members and to avoid the risk associated with any one country's accounting for too great a percentage of the Interpol's budget. Once these two variations were in place, all countries assessed above the minimum and below the maximum were adjusted accordingly such that the total percentage contributions worked out to be 100%.

In Option B the UN's model was utilized as the basis for assessing all countries, with the one variation being that the minimum and maximum contributions were adjusted to reflect different policy considerations between the UN and Interpol. As in Option A, the minimum contribution for Option B was set at 0.01%. The maximum contribution of 25% for the UN was lowered to 20% in order to ensure that no one country would be paying too great a share of the Organization's budget. All countries assessed above the minimum and below the maximum were then adjusted accordingly such that the total percentage contributions worked out to be 100%.

**Chart: Proposed Models Compared.

The columns from left to right are as follows:

Column 1: Member countries numbered from 1 to 177.

Column 2: Member country names.

Column 3: Member country budgetary unit obligation under existing model.

Column 4: Percent of Interpol budget paid by member countries under existing model.

Column 5: Percent of Interpol budget paid by member countries under Option A.

Column 6: Percent of Interpol budget paid by member countries under Option B.

Column 7: Dollars paid to Interpol under Option A per million dollars of GNP.

Column 8: Dollars paid to Interpol under Option B per million dollars of GNP.

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered By Budget Units)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
1	United States	102	5.684%	11.1167%	20.000%	0.36	0.65
2	Japan	100	5.572%	11.1167%	20.000%	0.52	0.94
3	Germany	100	5.572%	11.1167%	10.552%	1.14	1.08
4	France	100	5.572%	11.1167%	7.006%	1.76	1.11
5	Italy	72	4.012%	11.1167%	5.820%	2.37	1.24
6	United Kingdom	100	5.572%	11.1167%	5.450%	2.35	1.15
7	Canada	60	3.343%	3.1302%	2.925%	1.34	1.25
8	Spain	33.6	1.872%	2.9684%	2.774%	1.28	1.20
9	Netherlands	50	2.786%	1.8700%	1.747%	1.13	1.05
10	Australia	40	2.229%	1.6989%	1.587%	1.12	1.05
11	Brazil	5	0.279%	1.6850%	1.574%	0.58	0.54
12	Switzerland	49	2.730%	1.3917%	1.300%	1.08	1.01
13	Belgium	40	2.229%	1.2637%	1.181%	1.14	1.07
14	Argentina	20	1.114%	1.2626%	1.180%	1.04	0.97
15	Sweden	49	2.730%	1.2358%	1.155%	1.32	1.23
16	Russian Federation	36	2.006%	1.2335%	1.153%	0.84	0.79
17	Korea, Rep.	13	0.724%	1.1520%	1.076%	0.58	0.54
18	China*	36	2.006%	1.1392%	1.064%	0.26	0.24
19	Mexico	20	1.114%	1.1392%	1.064%	0.81	0.76
20	Austria	36	2.006%	1.0787%	1.008%	1.16	1.08
21	Denmark	20	1.114%	0.7924%	0.740%	1.14	1.07
22	Norway	20	1.114%	0.6982%	0.652%	1.12	1.05

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered By Budget Units)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
23	Saudi Arabia	17	0.947%	0.6435%	0.601%	NA	NA
24	Finland	18	1.003%	0.6225%	0.582%	1.27	1.19
25	Turkey	13	0.724%	0.5039%	0.471%	0.69	0.64
26	Portugal	11	0.613%	0.4934%	0.461%	1.19	1.11
27	South Africa	15	0.836%	0.4189%	0.391%	0.77	0.72
28	Greece	15	0.836%	0.4026%	0.376%	0.82	0.76
29	Israel	10	0.557%	0.4015%	0.375%	1.08	1.01
30	India	20	1.114%	0.3421%	0.320%	0.23	0.22
31	Ireland	9	0.502%	0.2572%	0.240%	1.01	0.94
32	New Zealand	5	0.279%	0.2537%	0.237%	1.08	1.01
33	Poland	20	1.114%	0.2234%	0.209%	0.44	0.41
34	Ukraine	15	0.836%	0.2176%	0.203%	0.87	0.81
35	Indonesia	8	0.446%	0.2153%	0.201%	0.25	0.23
36	Malaysia	7	0.390%	0.2095%	0.196%	0.57	0.53
37	Singapore	7	0.390%	0.2048%	0.191%	0.54	0.50
38	United Arab Emirates	13	0.724%	0.2036%	0.190%	NA	NA
39	Thailand	3	0.167%	0.1943%	0.182%	0.27	0.25
40	Iran	8	0.446%	0.1850%	0.173%	NA	NA
41	Venezuela	8	0.446%	0.1839%	0.172%	0.66	0.62
42	Chile	4	0.223%	0.1559%	0.146%	0.54	0.51
43	Kuwait	13	0.724%	0.1466%	0.137%	NA	NA
44	Hungary	5	0.279%	0.1385%	0.129%	0.76	0.71
45	Libya	13	0.724%	0.1303%	0.122%	NA	NA
46	Colombia	7	0.390%	0.1245%	0.116%	0.38	0.35
47	Czech Republic	16	0.892%	0.1222%	0.114%	0.61	0.57

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered By Budget Units)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
48	Peru	3	0.167%	0.1129%	0.105%	0.47	0.44
49	Algeria	13	0.724%	0.0989%	0.092%	0.55	0.51
50	Philippines	6	0.334%	0.0931%	0.087%	0.27	0.25
51	Luxembourg	5	0.279%	0.0780%	0.073%	1.01	0.94
52	Egypt	20	1.114%	0.0733%	0.068%	0.28	0.26
53	Syria	4	0.223%	0.0733%	0.068%	1.06	0.99
54	Slovenia	3	0.167%	0.0710%	0.066%	0.94	0.88
55	Pakistan	5	0.279%	0.0675%	0.063%	0.26	0.24
56	Belarus	5	0.279%	0.0652%	0.061%	0.71	0.66
57	Romania	9	0.502%	0.0640%	0.060%	0.43	0.40
58	Oman	5	0.279%	0.0582%	0.054%	NA	NA
59	Uruguay	3	0.167%	0.0559%	0.052%	0.74	0.69
60	Kazakhstan	3	0.167%	0.0547%	0.051%	0.60	0.56
61	Morocco	8	0.446%	0.0465%	0.043%	0.32	0.30
62	Slovak Republic	8	0.446%	0.0396%	0.037%	0.53	0.49
63	Cyprus	3	0.167%	0.0384%	0.036%	NA	NA
64	Iraq	10	0.557%	0.0372%	0.035%	NA	NA
65	Nigeria	8	0.446%	0.0372%	0.035%	0.33	0.31
66	Qatar	6	0.334%	0.0372%	0.035%	NA	NA
67	Iceland	3	0.167%	0.0372%	0.035%	1.26	1.18
68	Croatia	4	0.223%	0.0349%	0.033%	0.47	0.44
69	Tunisia	5	0.279%	0.0326%	0.030%	0.45	0.42
70	Uzbekistan	3	0.167%	0.0291%	0.027%	0.30	0.28
71	Cuba	3	0.167%	0.0279%	0.026%	NA	NA
72	Ecuador	3	0.167%	0.0233%	0.022%	0.32	0.30

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered By Budget Units)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
73	Brunei	3	0.167%	0.0233%	0.022%	NA	NA
74	Guatemala	2	0.111%	0.0209%	0.020%	0.32	0.30
75	Bahrain	3	0.167%	0.0198%	0.018%	NA	NA
76	Lebanon	3	0.167%	0.0186%	0.017%	0.37	0.35
77	Trinidad and Tobago	3	0.167%	0.0186%	0.017%	0.90	0.84
78	Costa Rica	2	0.111%	0.0186%	0.017%	0.50	0.47
79	Bahamas	3	0.167%	0.0175%	0.016%	NA	NA
80	Dominican Republic	2	0.111%	0.0175%	0.016%	0.33	0.31
81	Gabon	2	0.111%	0.0175%	0.016%	0.95	0.89
82	Malta	2	0.111%	0.0163%	0.015%	NA	NA
83	Paraguay	2	0.111%	0.0163%	0.015%	0.43	0.40
84	Lithuania	2	0.111%	0.0163%	0.015%	0.47	0.44
85	Panama	2	0.111%	0.0151%	0.014%	0.45	0.42
86	Cameroon	2	0.111%	0.0151%	0.014%	0.44	0.41
87	Sri Lanka	2	0.111%	0.0140%	0.013%	0.25	0.24
88	El Salvador	2	0.111%	0.0140%	0.013%	0.34	0.32
89	Estonia	2	0.111%	0.0140%	0.013%	0.75	0.70
90	Bulgaria	6	0.334%	0.0128%	0.012%	0.31	0.29
91	Azerbaijan	2	0.111%	0.0128%	0.012%	0.85	0.80
92	Zaire (Dem. Rep. Congo)	8	0.446%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.42	0.42
93	Zambia	8	0.446%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.72	0.72
94	Côte d'Ivoire	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.26	0.26
95	Ghana	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.39	0.39
96	Guinea	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.64	0.64
97	Kenya	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.28	0.28

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered By Budget Units)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
98	Monaco	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
99	Senegal	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.50	0.50
100	Sudan	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
101	Benin	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.22	1.22
102	Bolivia	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.39	0.39
103	Bosnia-Herzegovina	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
104	Jamaica	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.60	0.60
105	Liberia	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
106	Mauritania	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.23	2.23
107	Myanmar	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
108	Namibia	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.68	0.68
109	Sierra Leone	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.63	2.63
110	Suriname	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	5.61	5.61
111	Tanzania	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.47	0.47
112	Uganda	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.42	0.42
113	Zimbabwe	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.36	0.36
114	Bangladesh	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.08	0.08
115	Vietnam	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.11	0.11
116	Albania	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.90	0.90
117	Andorra	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
118	Angola	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.82	0.82
119	Antigua and Barbuda	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	5.04	5.04
120	Armenia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.02	1.02
121	Aruba	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
122	Barbados	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered By Budget Units)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
123	Belize	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	4.05	4.05
124	Botswana	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
125	Burkina Faso	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.01	1.01
126	Burundi	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.28	2.28
127	Cambodia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.79	0.79
128	Cape Verde	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	6.18	6.18
129	Central African Republic	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.37	2.37
130	Chad	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.35	2.35
131	Congo	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.34	1.34
132	Djibouti	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
133	Dominica	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	10.66	10.66
134	Equatorial Guinea	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	11.20	11.20
135	Ethiopia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.40	0.40
136	Fiji	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.23	1.23
137	Gambia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
138	Georgia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.53	0.53
139	Grenada	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	8.53	8.53
140	Guinea-Bissau	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	9.00	9.00
141	Guyana	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	4.18	4.18
142	Haiti	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.07	1.07
143	Honduras	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.61	0.61
144	Jordan	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.34	0.34
145	Kiribati	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	32.41	32.41
146	Kyrgyzstan	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.98	0.98
147	Laos	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.28	1.28

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered By Budget Units)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
148	Latvia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.42	0.42
149	Lesotho	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.83	1.83
150	Liechtenstein	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
151	Macedonia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.24	1.24
152	Madagascar	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.71	0.71
153	Malawi	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.33	1.33
154	Maldives	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	8.77	8.77
155	Mali	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.00	1.00
156	Marshall Islands	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	22.51	22.51
157	Mauritius	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.58	0.58
158	Moldova	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.96	0.96
159	Mongolia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.69	2.69
160	Mozambique	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.65	1.65
161	Nauru	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
162	Nepal	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.52	0.52
163	Netherlands Antilles	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
164	Nicaragua	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.43	1.43
165	Niger	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.29	1.29
166	Papua New Guinea	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.48	0.48
167	Rwanda	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.92	1.92
168	Sao Tome and Principe	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	54.01	54.01
169	Seychelles	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	4.62	4.62
170	Somalia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
171	St. Kitts and Nevis	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	10.13	10.13
172	St. Lucia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	4.40	4.40

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered By Budget Units)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
173	St. Vincent and Grenadines	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	9.21	9.21
174	Swaziland	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.17	2.17
175	Togo	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.90	1.90
176	Tonga	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	13.89	13.89
177	Yemen	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.40	0.40
	Total	1794.6	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
	*Data Includes Hong Kong						

NA: Not available

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered Alphabetically)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
1	Albania	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.90	0.90
2	Algeria	13	0.724%	0.0989%	0.092%	0.55	0.51
3	Andorra	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
4	Angola	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.82	0.82
5	Antigua and Barbuda	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	5.04	5.04
6	Argentina	20	1.114%	1.2626%	1.180%	1.04	0.97
7	Armenia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.02	1.02
8	Aruba	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
9	Australia	40	2.229%	1.6989%	1.587%	1.12	1.05
10	Austria	36	2.006%	1.0787%	1.008%	1.16	1.08
11	Azerbaijan	2	0.111%	0.0128%	0.012%	0.85	0.80
12	Bahamas	3	0.167%	0.0175%	0.016%	NA	NA
13	Bahrain	3	0.167%	0.0198%	0.018%	NA	NA
14	Bangladesh	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.08	0.08
15	Barbados	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
16	Belarus	5	0.279%	0.0652%	0.061%	0.71	0.66
17	Belgium	40	2.229%	1.2637%	1.181%	1.14	1.07
18	Belize	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	4.05	4.05
19	Benin	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.22	1.22
20	Bolivia	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.39	0.39
21	Bosnia-Herzegovina	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
22	Botswana	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
23	Brazil	5	0.279%	1.6850%	1.574%	0.58	0.54

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered Alphabetically)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
24	Brunei	3	0.167%	0.0233%	0.022%	NA	NA
25	Bulgaria	6	0.334%	0.0128%	0.012%	0.31	0.29
26	Burkina Faso	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.01	1.01
27	Burundi	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.28	2.28
28	Cambodia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.79	0.79
29	Cameroon	2	0.111%	0.0151%	0.014%	0.44	0.41
30	Canada	60	3.343%	3.1302%	2.925%	1.34	1.25
31	Cape Verde	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	6.18	6.18
32	Central African Republic	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.37	2.37
33	Chad	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.35	2.35
34	Chile	4	0.223%	0.1559%	0.146%	0.54	0.51
35	China*	36	2.006%	1.1392%	1.064%	0.26	0.24
36	Colombia	7	0.390%	0.1245%	0.116%	0.38	0.35
37	Congo	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.34	1.34
38	Costa Rica	2	0.111%	0.0186%	0.017%	0.50	0.47
39	Côte d'Ivoire	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.26	0.26
40	Croatia	4	0.223%	0.0349%	0.033%	0.47	0.44
41	Cuba	3	0.167%	0.0279%	0.026%	NA	NA
42	Cyprus	3	0.167%	0.0384%	0.036%	NA	NA
43	Czech Republic	16	0.892%	0.1222%	0.114%	0.61	0.57
44	Denmark	20	1.114%	0.7924%	0.740%	1.14	1.07
45	Djibouti	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
46	Dominica	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	10.66	10.66
47	Dominican Republic	2	0.111%	0.0175%	0.016%	0.33	0.31
48	Ecuador	3	0.167%	0.0233%	0.022%	0.32	0.30

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered Alphabetically)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
49	Egypt	20	1.114%	0.0733%	0.068%	0.28	0.26
50	El Salvador	2	0.111%	0.0140%	0.013%	0.34	0.32
51	Equatorial Guinea	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	11.20	11.20
52	Estonia	2	0.111%	0.0140%	0.013%	0.75	0.70
53	Ethiopia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.40	0.40
54	Fiji	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.23	1.23
55	Finland	18	1.003%	0.6225%	0.582%	1.27	1.19
56	France	100	5.572%	11.1167%	7.006%	1.76	1.11
57	Gabon	2	0.111%	0.0175%	0.016%	0.95	0.89
58	Gambia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
59	Georgia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.53	0.53
60	Germany	100	5.572%	11.1167%	10.552%	1.14	1.08
61	Ghana	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.39	0.39
62	Greece	15	0.836%	0.4026%	0.376%	0.82	0.76
63	Grenada	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	8.53	8.53
64	Guatemala	2	0.111%	0.0209%	0.020%	0.32	0.30
65	Guinea	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.64	0.64
66	Guinea-Bissau	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	9.00	9.00
67	Guyana	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	4.18	4.18
68	Haiti	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.07	1.07
69	Honduras	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.61	0.61
70	Hungary	5	0.279%	0.1385%	0.129%	0.76	0.71
71	Iceland	3	0.167%	0.0372%	0.035%	1.26	1.18
72	India	20	1.114%	0.3421%	0.320%	0.23	0.22
73	Indonesia	8	0.446%	0.2153%	0.201%	0.25	0.23

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered Alphabetically)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
74	Iran	8	0.446%	0.1850%	0.173%	NA	NA
75	Iraq	10	0.557%	0.0372%	0.035%	NA	NA
76	Ireland	9	0.502%	0.2572%	0.240%	1.01	0.94
77	Israel	10	0.557%	0.4015%	0.375%	1.08	1.01
78	Italy	72	4.012%	11.1167%	5.820%	2.37	1.24
79	Jamaica	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.60	0.60
80	Japan	100	5.572%	11.1167%	20.000%	0.52	0.94
81	Jordan	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.34	0.34
82	Kazakhstan	3	0.167%	0.0547%	0.051%	0.60	0.56
83	Kenya	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.28	0.28
84	Kiribati	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	32.41	32.41
85	Korea, Rep.	13	0.724%	1.1520%	1.076%	0.58	0.54
86	Kuwait	13	0.724%	0.1466%	0.137%	NA	NA
87	Kyrgyzstan	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.98	0.98
88	Laos	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.28	1.28
89	Latvia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.42	0.42
90	Lebanon	3	0.167%	0.0186%	0.017%	0.37	0.35
91	Lesotho	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.83	1.83
92	Liberia	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
93	Libya	13	0.724%	0.1303%	0.122%	NA	NA
94	Liechtenstein	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
95	Lithuania	2	0.111%	0.0163%	0.015%	0.47	0.44
96	Luxembourg	5	0.279%	0.0780%	0.073%	1.01	0.94
97	Macedonia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.24	1.24
98	Madagascar	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.71	0.71

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered Alphabetically)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
99	Malawi	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.33	1.33
100	Malaysia	7	0.390%	0.2095%	0.196%	0.57	0.53
101	Maldives	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	8.77	8.77
102	Mali	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.00	1.00
103	Malta	2	0.111%	0.0163%	0.015%	NA	NA
104	Marshall Islands	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	22.51	22.51
105	Mauritania	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.23	2.23
106	Mauritius	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.58	0.58
107	Mexico	20	1.114%	1.1392%	1.064%	0.81	0.76
108	Moldova	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.96	0.96
109	Monaco	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
110	Mongolia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.69	2.69
111	Morocco	8	0.446%	0.0465%	0.043%	0.32	0.30
112	Mozambique	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.65	1.65
113	Myanmar	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
114	Namibia	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.68	0.68
115	Nauru	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
116	Nepal	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.52	0.52
117	Netherlands	50	2.786%	1.8700%	1.747%	1.13	1.05
118	Netherlands Antilles	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
119	New Zealand	5	0.279%	0.2537%	0.237%	1.08	1.01
120	Nicaragua	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.43	1.43
121	Niger	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.29	1.29
122	Nigeria	8	0.446%	0.0372%	0.035%	0.33	0.31
123	Norway	20	1.114%	0.6982%	0.652%	1.12	1.05

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered Alphabetically)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
124	Oman	5	0.279%	0.0582%	0.054%	NA	NA
125	Pakistan	5	0.279%	0.0675%	0.063%	0.26	0.24
126	Panama	2	0.111%	0.0151%	0.014%	0.45	0.42
127	Papua New Guinea	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.48	0.48
128	Paraguay	2	0.111%	0.0163%	0.015%	0.43	0.40
129	Peru	3	0.167%	0.1129%	0.105%	0.47	0.44
130	Philippines	6	0.334%	0.0931%	0.087%	0.27	0.25
131	Poland	20	1.114%	0.2234%	0.209%	0.44	0.41
132	Portugal	11	0.613%	0.4934%	0.461%	1.19	1.11
133	Qatar	6	0.334%	0.0372%	0.035%	NA	NA
134	Romania	9	0.502%	0.0640%	0.060%	0.43	0.40
135	Russian Federation	36	2.006%	1.2335%	1.153%	0.84	0.79
136	Rwanda	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.92	1.92
137	Sao Tome and Principe	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	54.01	54.01
138	Saudi Arabia	17	0.947%	0.6435%	0.601%	NA	NA
139	Senegal	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.50	0.50
140	Seychelles	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	4.62	4.62
141	Sierra Leone	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.63	2.63
142	Singapore	7	0.390%	0.2048%	0.191%	0.54	0.50
143	Slovak Republic	8	0.446%	0.0396%	0.037%	0.53	0.49
144	Slovenia	3	0.167%	0.0710%	0.066%	0.94	0.88
145	Somalia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
146	South Africa	15	0.836%	0.4189%	0.391%	0.77	0.72
147	Spain	33.6	1.872%	2.9684%	2.774%	1.28	1.20
148	Sri Lanka	2	0.111%	0.0140%	0.013%	0.25	0.24

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered Alphabetically)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
149	St. Kitts and Nevis	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	10.13	10.13
150	St. Lucia	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	4.40	4.40
151	St. Vincent and Grenadines	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	9.21	9.21
152	Sudan	5	0.279%	0.0100%	0.010%	NA	NA
153	Suriname	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	5.61	5.61
154	Swaziland	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	2.17	2.17
155	Sweden	49	2.730%	1.2358%	1.155%	1.32	1.23
156	Switzerland	49	2.730%	1.3917%	1.300%	1.08	1.01
157	Syria	4	0.223%	0.0733%	0.068%	1.06	0.99
158	Tanzania	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.47	0.47
159	Thailand	3	0.167%	0.1943%	0.182%	0.27	0.25
160	Togo	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	1.90	1.90
161	Tonga	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	13.89	13.89
162	Trinidad and Tobago	3	0.167%	0.0186%	0.017%	0.90	0.84
163	Tunisia	5	0.279%	0.0326%	0.030%	0.45	0.42
164	Turkey	13	0.724%	0.5039%	0.471%	0.69	0.64
165	Uganda	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.42	0.42
166	Ukraine	15	0.836%	0.2176%	0.203%	0.87	0.81
167	United Arab Emirates	13	0.724%	0.2036%	0.190%	NA	NA
168	United Kingdom	100	5.572%	11.1167%	5.450%	2.35	1.15
169	United States	102	5.684%	11.1167%	20.000%	0.36	0.65
170	Uruguay	3	0.167%	0.0559%	0.052%	0.74	0.69
171	Uzbekistan	3	0.167%	0.0291%	0.027%	0.30	0.28
172	Venezuela	8	0.446%	0.1839%	0.172%	0.66	0.62
173	Vietnam	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.11	0.11

Proposed models compared

	Country (Ordered Alphabetically)	Budget Units	Interpol Percent Contribution	Option A	Option B	\$ Per Million Under Option A	\$ Per Million Under Option B
174	Yemen	2	0.111%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.40	0.40
175	Zaire (Dem. Rep. Congo)	8	0.446%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.42	0.42
176	Zambia	8	0.446%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.72	0.72
177	Zimbabwe	3	0.167%	0.0100%	0.010%	0.36	0.36
	Total	1794.6	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
	*Data Includes Hong Kong						

NA: Not available