Information security and
crime prevention
IT security and crime prevention methods
Explanations
| Introduction: goals and objectives |
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This document gives an introduction to what an investigator needs to know about
Information Technology (IT) security measures in order to be able to carry out
investigations in an IT environment and to give advice in crime prevention methods.
Information Technology plays an important and vital role in all sectors of
society. As a consequence, security has become an essential component of IT.
However, it is a complex subject and the appropriate measures will often depend,
to a large extent, on the type and location of the IT equipment.
The potential security threats and risks have to be carefully assessed in every
situation.It is absolutely vital that all concerned are made aware of the threats
and risks that may affect them, and over which they have control. Only then
will they fully understand and apply the appropriate security procedures.
This report attempts to explain the various threats and risks posed by criminal
activity in IT environments and offers advice about security procedures and
computer crime prevention methods. It is not intended to be a comprehensive
study. Threats to information systems may arise from intentional or unintentional
acts and may come from internal or external sources. This guide will address
only threats, made with criminal intent, to confidentiality and integrity. Availability
security functions will only be addressed if they have an effect on confidentiality
and/or integrity. Examples of prevention methods will be given.
The prevention methods in this report can be used to prevent crime in companies,
but can also be used to protect private computer systems.
| 1. IT security: definitions |
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CONFIDENTIALITY (Secrecy)
Information and other resources are only disclosed for those 'users'
(persons, entities or processes) who are authorised to have access to it.
INTEGRITY
Information and other resources are modified only by those 'users'
who have the right to do so. The accuracy and completeness of the data and
information is also guaranteed.
AVAILABILITY
Authorised 'users' can access information and other resources
when needed.
THREAT
A 'threat' is a potential undesirable incident.
RISK
A 'risk' is the estimated probability that a 'threat'
will be activated.
| 2. Information processing and IT security |
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In order to protect the data held on a computer system, various steps have
to be taken: individual users should only be able to read the information which
is needed to do their job; they should only be able to modify information which
is specifically their job to modify. Finally, some information should not be
accessible at all for individual users, e.g. the various log records.
In simple terms, information processing involves the following types of operation:
- READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE information
- TRANSPORT (in one way or another) of information
- STORE information (on computer 'media' to keep it somewhere).
i. READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE
Information is 'Read/Created/Modified/Deleted' by a 'User'.
A 'User' is a person or a process (e.g. a computer program). Authorisation
to 'Read' information is a question of confidentiality while 'Create/Modify/Delete'
is primarily a question of integrity.
ii. TRANSPORT
One of the simplest ways of 'transporting' information is the internal
transport between the keyboard, the memory and the hard disk in a Personal Computer.
Another is the external 'transport' of a diskette from one place to
another. Information can also be 'transported' using a 'Local
Area Network' (LAN) and/or a 'Wide Area Network' (WAN). Insecure
'transport' affects both confidentiality and integrity.
A special kind of undesirable 'transport' is 'Electronic Emission'
(see below).
iii. STORE information
Once the information has been 'stored' on some kind of media (diskettes,
tapes etc.), it may become the target of unauthorized activities which will
have an effect on the confidentiality and/or integrity of the information.
| 3. Important IT security functions |
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As well as knowledge of computer architecture, the investigator also needs
to be familiar with a number of important IT security functions and organizational
matters if she/he is to be able to give advice on prevention methods and conduct
investigations.
Some important functions are:
- Information classification
- Documentation rules
- Administration and personnel
- User Identification and Authorisation
- Logging
- Back-up
- Firewalls
- Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
- Incident Handling (IH)
| 3.1. Information classification |
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It is essential to classify the information according to the appropriate level
of availability, e.g. 'open', 'confidential', 'secret'
or 'top secret'. Only then will it be possible to apply the most effective
security measures. The classification should be carried out by the management
or by the 'information owner'.
All systems, but especially the 'Identification and Authorisation system',
'Information Classification system' and 'Application systems',
must be fully documented.
IT security policy and the security rules for the organisation as well as
details of contingency plans in the event of a major incident should be documented
in a 'Security Handbook'. The chapter on IT security should have separate sections
for each user category, e.g. 'Management', 'System Administrators', 'End Users'
etc.
Create a checklist with guidelines concerning the actions which have to be
taken in case of an incident (e.g. immediate reaction, who to contact). See
chapter 'Incident Handling'.
| 3.3. Administration and personnel |
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Success in information security work depends first and foremost on developing
good basic working practices and establishing procedures to ensure that they
are maintained. It is also important to create a security-conscious atmosphere
and establish a disciplined approach.
If confidential information is to be handled, it is essential that the people
chosen for the job are absolutely reliable. They should be security screened
to a level equal to the highest level of confidential information they are likely
to be asked to work on. Access to information should be restricted to that which
the individual 'needs to know' to do his job. Particularly sensitive material
should be split into sections that only authorised staff can handle; no member
of staff should have access to all the information.
Furthermore, security measures will only be effective if staff are properly
trained. It is essential that they understand the problem. This can be achieved
with in-house training. The individual users must be trained how to use the
network, how to handle confidential information, making back-ups etc. Employees
can be taught what to do to counter certain threats, what they should not do,
whom they can call and where they can get help. It is also very important to
encourage employees to report incidents so that steps can be taken to prevent
any further damage.
New or temporary employees should be given introductory training, during which
data security and data integrity can be explained. It might also be useful to
consider including a clause on security and confidentiality obligations in employees
contracts.
(a) Management responsibilities
To achieve functional and cost-effective IT security, a number of initial steps
must be taken by the management:
Risk analysis - What are the threats and what is the risk that they
will be activated? Threats and risks, acceptable or unacceptable, vary between
different organizations. It is important to analyse the risks to make it possible
for the management to form a policy with their security intentions.
Policy - There must be an Information security policy written and approved
by management. No management approved policy means no resources. It should include
the main security targets, information classification principles, responsible
persons, and principles to reach the targets.
Security plan - A plan has to be made to define how the targets and the
intentions in the policy document should be realised. A priority list must be
set up because it may not be possible to realise everything in the policy at
the same time. The plan is a living document and has to be scrutinised by the
IT security officer.
Security architecture - With the risk analysis, the policy and the
plan as a base, security architecture must be chosen. Security architecture
is a high level description of technical security functions and organisational
needs to fulfil the security demands.
Implementation - With the security architecture as a base, different
security functions and products must be selected to implement the security architecture.
The main points requiring attention are:
- All senior management, and not just the computer security manager, should
be sufficiently familiar with the computer systems in use, to enable them
to know what is going on and why.
- The role of the system manager is crucial. He/she must be of the highest
degree of integrity, and sufficiently computer literate to be able to administer
the system in a secure and responsible manner. The system manager access level
should be restricted to the minimum number of staff required. However it must
be possible for the IT security manager to check on the system managers
activities.
- The only way of establishing how a problem has occurred, whether the origin
is accidental or deliberate, is to examine the logging information stored
on the computer. (One of the reasons for restricting privileges is that the
logging information of the system is available at this level). Analysis of
this information should show when, where and how the problem occurred. In
some cases careful examination will also indicate who was responsible. It
is essential therefore that the logging capabilities of the particular system
are fully understood and utilised. If the logging functions on the system
are inadequate, consideration should be given to acquiring suitable software.
(b) User responsibilities
Users should be given specific guidelines about what they should do - and
more importantly - what they should not do. These guidelines should be distributed
in written form, and signed for. This will counter the defence that they were
unaware of the contents of the guidelines and at the same time provide the investigator
with written proof. Specimen guidelines are given below. They are certainly
not exhaustive and others can be added to take account of particular circumstances.
- Do not use any computer equipment without permission.
- Do not try to access information unless you know you are authorised to
do so.
- Do not alter any information on a computer system unless you know you are
authorised to do so. (It is also important to provide a clear written statement
of what information each user is allowed to access, to whom that information
may be disclosed and what action will be taken if the rules are broken.)
- Do not use a company or authority computer for personal matters without
permission.
- Do not leave a working computer unattended, without using security options
that demand retyping a password (e.g. screen saver password).
- Make sure you know what to do in the event of a virus being discovered
on the system. Use virus protection programs.
- Be aware of malicious program code, when loading files, mails etc. from
the internet or other media.
- Keep your password and user-ID confidential.
- Do not allow anyone else to use your password. (If people like engineers
need access to the system, they should be referred to the system manager.)
- Do not use anyone elses password.
- Remember that anything done on the system using your ID and password can
be your responsibility.
| 3.4. User identification and authorisation |
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Access to a computer can be restricted by means of controls based on various
kinds of 'Identification and Authorisation' systems.
Identification is a two step function: (a) to Identify the user and
(b) to Authenticate (validate) the identity (i.e. confirm that it is true).
The simplest systems rely on passwords only. More sophisticated systems use
cards (e.g. 'SmartCard') and/or 'biometric' methods in combination
with passwords.
3.4.1. Identification
(a) Password systems
These give some measure of protection against casual browsing of information,
but will rarely stop a determined criminal. A computer password acts like a
key to a computer. Allowing several people to use the same password is like
everyone using the same key.
Passwords should:
- Be issued to an individual and kept confidential, they should not be shared
with anyone. (The golden rule is ONE PERSON ONE PASSWORD). Should a temporary
user need access to a system, it is usually fairly simple to add to the list
of authorised users; once the temporary user has finished his work, his user-ID
must be deleted from the system.)
- Be distinct from the user-ID.
- Ideally be:
- alphanumeric and
- at least six characters long.
- Be changed regularly, at least every 30 days. It is possible to warn the
user automatically when his password expires. To ensure that he enters a new
one, he will not be able to enter the system after the expiration date, although
he may be allowed a limited number of 'grace' log-ins.
- Be properly managed. This will involve:
- Using a password history list, giving all the passwords used
in the past year or two. New passwords will be checked against the list
and not accepted if they have already been used.
- Making a list of frequently used passwords such as names, brands and
other words that are easy to guess and therefore not suitable as passwords.
This list will be used in the same way as the history list, except that
new passwords will not be added; only the system manager will be able
to change the list. Some systems conform to these standards and generate
passwords automatically.
- Be removed immediately if an employee leaves the organisation or gives
notice of leaving.
Last but not least it is important to note that care should be taken with
the password used for remote maintenance. Standard passwords which are often
used to get access to different systems, for maintenance purposes, should always
be avoided.
(b) Other identification systems
The 'password' method is built on something you 'know'
and might be misused by someone getting hold of the password. A system built
on something you 'know' (password, PIN-code etc.) AND
something you 'have' (i.e. authorisation card) is a much stronger
system. Even if someone gets hold of your password it is useless without the
card. Today, the strongest method is something you 'know',
something you 'have' and something you 'are'
(biometrics).
There are two main types of card:
- Magnetic strip card: As its name suggests, this type of
card has a magnetic strip containing some confidential information to be used
together with the holders personal code;
- Chip card: Instead of a magnetic strip, the card has a
built in microchip. The simplest type contains a memory chip (e.g. telephone
cards) containing some information but has no processing capability. The other,
better, type is the 'Active' (or 'Smart') Card. It contains
a microchip with both a memory to store some information and a processor.
It is often used in combination with cryptographic techniques.
Biometric systems make use of specific personal characteristics (biometrics)
of a specific person e.g. fingerprint, voice, keystroke characteristics or the
'pattern' of the retina. Biometric systems are still quite expensive
(except for the keystroke system) and not very common.
However, even these sophisticated techniques are not infallible.
3.4.2. Authorisation
After identification and authentication of the user (subject) there
must be a function and set of rules to control what object (files, devices
etc.) each user is allowed to access. This is the Access Control system.
Most computer systems have some kind of log. Even stand-alone systems
sometimes have identification and authorisation systems (and a log) if different
users, with different authorisation levels, use them and/or when it is desirable
to prevent users from using the disk drive (as an anti-virus measure) or changing
files.
In a multi-user system (client-server-, mini-, mainframe-systems) there are
always logging functions and there is often more than one kind of log.
The desired level of protection will only be achieved if the various security
measures are properly followed up with a log that can be analysed as
and when necessary. A proper log will answer the questions:
- WHO (user)
- WHEN (time - date)
- WHERE (place)
- WHAT (event/activity)
- ADDITIONAL (Additional information depending on activity)
There are often many different types of logs, e.g.:
- HISTORY files (e.g. Internet activities)
- TEMPORARY files
- SYSTEMS log
- TRANSACTION log
- SECURITY SYSTEM log
- DATABASE log
- APPLICATION log
- TECHNICAL log (mainly on mainframes)
Log information is one of the most important items for a computer crime
investigator to look for.
Although modern computer systems are generally very reliable, breakdowns and
failures do occur, and users can make mistakes that lead to the accidental destruction
of information. To guard against total loss of information under these circumstances,
it is necessary to set up procedures for making regular copies. The information
on the computer system should be copied to some form of back-up medium. This
medium can then be stored in a safe place until it is needed.
For particularly valuable information several copies should be made, and each
copy stored in a different place and at least in different buildings, if not
different cities.
The frequency with which back-ups are taken should be based on the frequency
with which the information changes, the relative value of the information, and
the problems its loss would cause. Regular back-up of data and system files
are an essential security measure. When combined with the logging information,
they should provide a comprehensive security information package. The following
guidelines may be of assistance when making back-ups:
- Make sure that regular back-up copies are made of both data and
system files.
- Back-up cycles should be of sufficient length to be of some use in the
future. 24-hour overwrite cycles are not recommended.
- Take a full back-up (both system and data) out of the cycle on a regular
basis and archive it off site for an extended period.
- Back-up tapes/diskettes should be kept in a safe place under lock and key
and away from the computer and where they are secured from fire, flood, magnetic
and electric fields etc., preferably off site.
- Periodically test the back-up to ensure that the information can actually
be restored in an emergency; do not wait for disaster to strike to find the
back-up system does not work.
Back-ups (including old ones) are another important source of information
for an investigator.
One frequently asked question is 'how to secure the internal network from
an external network such as the Internet?' One solution is to set up a
firewall system.
'A firewall is a system or group of systems that enforces an access control
policy between two networks. The actual means by which this is accomplished
varies widely, but in principle, the firewall can be thought of as a pair of
mechanisms: one, which exists to lock traffic, and the other that exists to
permit traffic. Some firewalls place a greater emphasis on blocking traffic,
while others emphasise permitting traffic. Probably the most important thing
to recognise about a firewall is that it implements an access control policy.
If you dont have a good idea what kind of access you want to permit or
deny, or you simply permit someone or some product to configure a firewall based
on what they or it think it should do, then they are making policy for your
organisation as a whole.' (The Internet Firewall FAQ )
Firewall systems are typically the first line of defence between an internal
network (ex. of companies but also private networks) and the outside world,
especially its connection to the Internet. It should be configured not only
to allow certain operations to occur (FTP, mail delivery, etc), but to make
it difficult or impossible for an attacker on the outside to use the firewall
to penetrate the internal nets.
There are primarily two types of firewall systems, the packet-filtering firewall
system and the application-level gateway.
The major difference between the two techniques lies in the flow of communication.
A packet-filter gateway acts as a router between the two networks; as packets
flow from their source to the destination, the gateway either forwards or blocks
the packets. With application gateways, all packets are addressed to a user-level
application on the gateway that relays the packets between the two communication
points.
Firewall system requirements
Firewall systems must support features that will do the following:
- Prevent unauthorized users from accessing the internal network.
- Prevent unwanted IP service requests from being passed through it to the
internal network.
- Log its activities.
- Be easy to administer.
- Provide alarm mechanisms.
- Preferably support SNMP.
- Be configurable at the user, service, and IP host level.
Security policy
If a firewall system will be deployed to secure the access to the Internet,
the configuration of the firewall system must reflect the security policy of
the organization. The security policy must address, as a minimum, the following
questions:
What is the policy on IP addresses?
Is the organization's IP address space a registered IP address?
Who is or will be the organisation's Internet service provider?
What is the Internet service provider's security policy? Is their network
secure?
Will firewall systems be used to secure the connection to the Internet?
If so, what type of firewall system?
What is the firewall system architecture?
All entry and exit points to the Internet need to be identified. The firewall
network architecture must be defined to control authorised inbound and outbound
connections.
What is the policy for inbound access to systems?
Which specific protocols will be allowed to access nodes on the internal network?
What is the policy on outbound access to nodes on the Internet?
Do remote offices or branches connect to the home office?
If so, are remote offices directly connected to the Internet or is their access
to the Internet through the home office?
If there is a direct connection between the remote office and the Internet,
verify that if the security of the remote office is compromised, the security
of the corporate network is not compromised.
Are there external networks that are not trusted?
Are there external networks that do need access to the internal network via
the Internet?
| 3.8. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) |
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Do I need an Intrusion Detection System if I have a firewall?
Yes, the main purpose with a firewall is to protect against unauthorized external
attacks but it will normally leave the network unprotected from internal attacks
or intrusions. Firewalls sometimes fail to protect from external intrusions
because:
- It is hard to configure the firewall properly
- Hacker/Crackers can get some packets through most firewalls and firewalls
dont know what happens once someone gets through them
- The software contains a software bug (software always has bugs)
- Bad protocols can be blocked by the firewall but HTTP is allowed through
and 'hack' in HTTP will pass through
- The firewall can only protect against known problems
An intruder is somebody attempting to break into or misuse the system. Intruders
can be divided into two categories:
- Outsiders - Intruders from outside your own network who try to attack
your system via dial-up lines, the Internet, a vendor or other 'partner' etc.
- Insiders - Intruders that are authorised to use your internal network
but are misusing their privileges.
There are different types of IDS. Two main types are:
- Statistical detection - The IDS looks for deviations from statistical
measures to detect unusual behaviour. A set of variables is defined for subject
and objects such as servers, files, users and other resources. A 'normal'
value is set for each variable by looking at historical data or by setting
expected values. When system activities occur, the list of variables is maintained
and updated for each subject or object.
- Pattern (or signature) matching detection - This type of IDS compares
activities against a collection of known attacks or a set of rules. The main
idea is to watch for events that matches one of the patterns or violates the
rules.
Why should I use a firewall and an IDS? Because most attacks come from inside
and every company or organisation needs a well managed single point of entry
as well. In addition, a Firewall can keep hackers running automated intrusion
programs out of the internal network. Otherwise those programs can detect and
exploit holes in your security architecture. There is a lot of information explaining
different IDS on the Internet.
| 3.9. Incident Handling System |
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Even if you have installed a firewall and an Intrusion Detection System someone
has to take care of an incident when it occurs (not 'if' it occurs, because
it will happen sooner or later). To be well prepared is the best way to handle
an incident. It is very important to stay calm and not panic when an incident
occurs. It is also very important to have a special form to register incidents.
For example the SANS Institute has a step by step method for incident handling
and the latest information can be obtained from the Internet at address ih@sans.org.
Their method has six stages:
- preparation
- detection
- containment
- eradication
- recovery
- follow-up
Preparation
This stage covers things like policy, management support, training and interfaces
to law enforcement.
Identification
How to identify an incident, responsible staff, co-ordination with network suppliers,
etc.
Containment
Create the on-site team to survey the situation. Backup of the system. Risk
determination (to let the system run) etc.
Eradication
Perform vulnerability analysis. Remove the cause of the incident, etc
Recovery
Restore the system. Validate the system, etc
Follow-up
Develop a follow-up report.
The main types of computer architecture are indicated below. In many cases,
the specific threats and risks to which a particular system is exposed will
depend on its architecture. However, there are a number of threats which can
affect all systems, irrespective of their architecture.
Main architecture types
- Microcomputers
- Network architectures and mini computers
- Mainframes
- Hand-held computers.
| 4.1. Microcomputers (stand-alone) |
|
These computers have no facilities for permanent external communications, apart
from links to peripherals (e.g. printer, scanner, streamer, extra disk drive
etc.). Nowadays it is common to have a modem and a temporary connection to the
Internet.
This architecture is easiest to 'protect' but it is also the architecture
where the users are least aware of the possible threats and risks. If it is
connected to the Internet it can be vulnerable to external attacks if it is
not properly configured. The user is responsible for back-ups, keeping media
in a safe place, protecting data from unauthorized access, etc.
| Examples: |
Personal Computer (IBM PC-compatible) - Desktop, Laptop
Macintosh, Amiga, etc. |
| 4.2. Network architectures and mini computers |
|
A mini computer is linked to several workstations to serve a limited number
of users. The workstations may consist of just a keyboard and screen, or microcomputers
(so-called 'intelligent' terminals) may be used. Today, these mini computers
are often referred to as 'servers' linked to their workstations through
a Local Area Network (LAN). Commonly known as client-server architecture.
In many organizations the old mainframe architecture is now being replaced
with a number of 'servers' each of which has a different set of functions. Connections
from the LAN to Wide Area Networks (WAN) are common.
The user is only responsible for backing up the files on the hard disk on
his own workstation (if it has one). One or more administrators are responsible
for all other back-ups, loading new programs etc. Management of the network
is normally left to a Network Administrator.
| Examples: |
UNIX-systems, OS/2-servers, and IBM AS400
Digital Micro VAX, etc. |
Used in big organisations to serve a great number of users and/or where considerable
computing capacity is needed. A special computer room with air conditioning
is needed, too. This is often located in a restricted area of the building and
specialists are required to operate the computer. Network operators monitor
the communication functions and assist users if there are communication problems.
System development and programming is a task for specialised staff. The user
is only responsible for backing up the files on the hard disk of his workstation
(if it has a disk). Because of the very fast technical development in the field
of client-server it is today not possible to clearly define the difference between
mainframes and servers.
This type of computers, like personal organizers, is completely different from
the others and is discussed in section
'Technical devices & communications'
in the Interpol Computer Crime Manual. The most important prevention method
is to keep the equipment in a safe place and away from unauthorized persons.
| 5. Threats and crime prevention methods |
|
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This section gives examples of the threats that may occur. Some may be encountered
in all types of environment, others may only occur with specific types of computer
architecture.
The prevention methods mentioned are only given as examples. The risk of the
threat being activated must be assessed in each organisation and depends on
factors such as the company's information policy, employees' awareness, etc.
In the following tables, the various threats to which a system may be exposed
are grouped according to where the information is located in the IT process.
READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE refers to information (data and software)
inside the computer system.
TRANSPORT refers to information (data and software) 'transported'
via a network or on media.
STORE refers to information (data and software) when it is stored
on computer media and taken out of the computer system. (I.e. back-up tapes/diskettes).
| 5.1. Architecture-independent threats
|
|
There are a number of important 'architecture-independent security targets':
- Members of staff, with certain responsibilities, powers, information
- Media handling
- Malicious programs
- Electronic emission
5.1.1. Members of staff
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Disloyal staff |
See advice given above in 'Important
IT security functions'.
The strongest form of security is often procedural security with attendant
staff awareness and responsibility. |
| Unauthorized access to information by users |
Users should be given specific written guidelines on what
they should and should not do. Guidelines should be signed for.
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting privileges.
Do not reveal your password too anyone.
Keep identification and authorisation cards in a safe
place.
Regularly check logs.
Regularly check that configuration is correct.
Install an Intrusion Detection System.
See above, chapter 'Important IT security
functions'
|
| Unauthorized access to information
by system administrators, programmers, etc. |
The same as above and:
Use separate systems for program development and for 'production'.
Restrict access to equipment with sensitive information;
adopt 'two-man rule'.
Restrict use of 'super user'/'root'
privileges.
|
| Unauthorized access to information
by temporary staff, e.g. consultants, service engineers etc. |
As for other staff and:
Limit their access to the system to the time and day required
for the specific task.
Do not forget to cancel their access rights and close
their temporary accounts.
Do not leave communication lines for remote servicing
open when not needed.
|
5.1.2. unauthorized access from external sources
| Threat |
Prevention method |
|
Unauthorized access
|
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting privileges.
Regularly check logs.
Regularly check that configuration is correct. Install
a firewall.
See above chapter 'Important IT security
functions'
|
5.1.3. Media handling
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Total loss of information through theft of media |
Media should be kept in a safe place under lock and key. |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information as a result
of unauthorized access to, or loan of, media |
Encrypt sensitive information. Staff handling the media
should not have access to the encryption keys.
'Two-man rule' for back-up.
'Two-man rule' for access to archives.
|
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information during servicing
|
Never send equipment with sensitive information on mounted
media for servicing.
(It is not enough to 'Delete' sensitive information because of
'Undelete /unerase' possibilities) |
5.1.4. Malicious program code
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Viruses and other malicious programs |
Install 'anti-virus software'. See Chapter 'Investigations',
Section
'Malicious program code'
in the Interpol Computer Crime Manual. |
| Programs altered to obtain access to, or manipulate, information
without authorisation |
Depends on computer architecture.
Use separate systems for program development and for
'production'.
If possible, restrict access to 'source code',
'compilers' and 'editors' in 'production'
system and restrict use or installation of non-standard software packages.
An Intrusion Detection System might detect this type of
problem. See above chapter 'Important IT Security functions'
|
5.1.5. Electronic Emission
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Despite all precautions, it is still possible for a determined
intruder to eavesdrop on information by picking up and interpreting electromagnetic
emissions from the Personal Computer or workstation. In a manner somewhat
similar to the way in which it is possible to detect the operation of a
television receiver and determine which channel is being watched. This type
of eavesdropping is most likely to occur when very sensitive information,
such as that of high commercial value or dealing with matters of national
security is involved. |
Use equipment with no or limited signal leakage ('tempest')
or put the equipment in a shielded room. Although effective, those methods
are expensive and are only to be recommended when there is an extremely
high risk. Optical fibres can be used to prevent emission leakage from
the lines running between peripherals and the Local Area Network (LAN).
Encryption of the Wide Area Network (WAN) will not stop
electromagnetic emissions but the eavesdropper will not be able to use
the information without the encryption key.
|
| 5.2. Microcomputer (stand-alone, Personal
Computer) systems |
|
Much sensitive information is stored on personal computer systems. The main
risk is unauthorized access to that data, or that the data may become corrupted
or lost.
READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Corruption of files (program or data). A major cause of
data loss and corruption is the introduction of viruses to computer systems. |
Keep program diskettes write-protected at all times.
Do not keep data and software on the same diskette. Otherwise,
if software becomes corrupted or infected, the data will usually be lost
as well. Making files read-only will prevent them from being infected
by some viruses, but not all of them. All media should be scanned for
viruses before use, preferably on a system specially designated for the
purpose.
|
| Unauthorized access of information
stored in the computer |
Restrict physical access to the Personal Computer, by locking
the door (and the machine if possible) whenever it has to be left unattended.
Machines should never be left switched on and running, unless a reliable
software protection mechanism has been installed. |
| Unauthorized use of the computer
|
As above. |
| Malicious programs (i.e. viruses) |
See Chapter 'Investigations', Section 'Malicious program code' in the Interpol
Computer Crime Manual. |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information during servicing
|
Never send equipment with sensitive information on mounted
media for servicing.
(It is not enough to 'delete' sensitive information because of 'undelete/unerase'
possibilities). |
| Theft of the computer |
Restrict physical access to the Personal Computer, by
locking the door (and the machine if possible) whenever it has to be left
unattended.
Laptops are particularly at risk when left unattended
in hotel rooms etc.
Use cryptography to protect information from unauthorized
access.
|
TRANSPORT
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Loss of confidential or secret information during transport |
Transport media in sealed envelopes and/or locked boxes. |
| Manipulation of media during transport |
As above and electronic seal (cryptologic checksum) on
information. |
| Total loss of media during transport |
Never leave media unattended in cars, hotel rooms etc. |
STORE
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information |
Diskettes and other media should be kept locked up in a
safe place when not in use. |
| Physical loss of information |
As above and it is advisable to install removable hard
disks, which should be kept in a safe place. |
| Total loss of information through theft of computer and/or
media |
Regular back-ups of data and system files are essential.
Together with the logging information, they will provide a comprehensive
security information package. For back-up guidelines, see 3.6 |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information as a result
of unauthorized access to, or loan of, media |
See 'Architecture-independent threats'
above. |
| 5.3. Network architectures and mini computer
systems |
|
Local Area Network (LAN)
If a Personal Computer (PC) is connected to a network, there are two other
possibilities for interfering with data, in addition to the dangers of physical
access to the machine (as mentioned above).
Firstly, it becomes possible to access the information stored on the PC via
the network. Care should therefore be taken to ensure networking software is
correctly configured, and that only that information which is intended to be
generally accessible is stored in directories which can be accessed via a network.
Secondly, the danger of leaving a PC unattended is much greater: not only
can the data on the PC itself be compromised, but there is also a risk that
any data which the rightful user may be able to access over the network will
also be compromised.
In a network environment, especially where sensitive material is in use, it
is essential to keep a central record of activity, i.e. a log. This should be
held on a machine that is known to be secure, and should contain a record of
ALL activity on the network; there should also be a procedure for examining
the log, so that all suspicious events can be highlighted and investigated.
Wide Area Network (WAN)
Networks are connected either by cable, by microwave or satellite. The latter
are vulnerable to interception as are any radio transmissions unless the data
is encrypted. The transmission of electronic signals is governed by standards
that are called 'protocols'. There are many standards, the most common
is the TCP/IP which is the standard packet-switching protocol used for the Internet.
Such connection can be protected against improper use or interception in various
ways. The best way is to use Identification, Authentication and Cryptography
as well as firewall and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
Costs have also to be considered. Telecommunication companies can offer the
use of dedicated lines - as often used by financial institutions, which means
that these lines are not available for normal public use and are protected against
intrusion, but they cost substantially more. This also applies to encryption.
There are a number of encryption standards and devices ranging from small logical
keys installed on sending and receiving equipment to higher levels of coding
which use complicated mathematical cycles and algorithms. The decision to implement
such higher level systems will have to be taken in the light of the value of
transmitted data.
It must also be remembered that encryption is not an infallible solution and
that its use raises various problems, e.g. several countries are developing,
or discussing the development of a specific law to regulate the use of encryption.
Even when communications are well protected, problems of unauthorized access
can occur if a well-protected system is linked directly to another that is not
protected. Any given system is only as secure as those to which it is connected.
The Internet
Victims of Internet attacks are often organizations that did not bother too
much about their security or who trusted some sales person who said that the
Internet connection was absolutely safe.
A lot of safeguards are mentioned above and they are applicable for the Internet
as well. Some additions are:
- Do not connect computers or entire networks, which contain your critical
information (e.g. financial, confidential, privacy) to the Internet.
- If possible restrict the way to the Internet to just one single point of
connection.
- Do not store your password or identification number on your hard disk, protect
it otherwise from unauthorized access. Create a password policy (see chapter
3.4.1, identification - password systems).
- Check and update your list of user accounts.
- Install a firewall system and an IDS.
- Do not download files or open emails which you do not trust.
- Install an anti-virus software and update it frequently.
- Be aware of shared-files which might be accessed of unauthorized persons.
- Be aware of cookies, Java and ActiveX applets, etc.
- Install only minimal options.
THREATS
READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Manipulations or unauthorized access to software or information
in each workstation (PC) in the network |
See chapter 5.2. Microcomputer systems |
| Unauthorized access to information
in the 'server' by users |
Users should be given specific written guidelines on what
they are allowed and not allowed to do. Guidelines should be signed for.
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting privileges.
Regularly check logs.
Regularly check that configuration is correct. IDS should
be installed.
|
| Unauthorized access to information
by system administrators, programmers etc. |
As above and:
Use separate systems for program development and for 'production'.
Restrict access to server; adopt 'two-man rule'.
Restrict use of 'super user'/'root'
privileges.
|
| Corruption of files (program or data). A major cause of
data loss and corruption is the introduction of viruses to computer systems.
|
All media should be scanned for viruses, preferably on
a system specially designated for the purpose, before use.
Erase all unnecessary codes, default and unused procedures.
|
| Total loss of information through 'disk crash' or deliberate
destruction of files |
Regular back-ups of data and system files are essential.
Together with the logging information, they will provide a comprehensive
security information package. For back-up guidelines, see 3.6 |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information during servicing
|
Some mini-server servicing can be done 'on-site' but in
the case of some hardware problems the equipment will have to be taken
away for repair by the service company/vendor.
Never send equipment with sensitive information on media
for servicing without a verifiable guarantee that the information will
be destroyed. (It is not enough to 'delete' the sensitive information
because of 'undelete' and 'unformat' possibilities)
Remember that after repair, the disk drives could be reused
somewhere else and your information might be compromised.
If it is decided to replace a disk with sensitive information,
destroy it yourself.
|
|
Theft of the server
|
The server should be kept locked up in a safe place. |
TRANSPORT in Local Area Network (LAN)
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Interception of cables |
Segmentation of the LAN.
Use optical fibres.
Regularly inspect LAN.
Encrypt LAN.
|
| Interception of networks components (like 'routers', 'bridges',
'gateways', 'repeaters' etc.) |
Restrict physical access to components.
Regularly check that the configuration of each individual
component is correct.
|
| Manipulation of network components |
As above. |
| Unapproved workstations |
The system should be set up in a way that the management
must approve the workstations before they can be used.
Regularly check that the configuration is correct.
|
| Network administrator accessing user files |
Network Administrators should be given specific written
guidelines on what they should and should not do. Guidelines should be
signed for.
Restrict use of 'administrator' privileges.
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system.
Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting privileges.
|
| Access to the LAN from 'outside' |
Provide guidelines for the use of modems or other connections.
IDS and firewall should be used.
Regularly check that the configuration is correct.
|
TRANSPORT in Wide Area Network (WAN)
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Interception of cables |
Communications can be encrypted, but there may be legal
restrictions. |
| Interception of radio communications |
As above. |
| Intruders ('hacking'/'cracking') |
Use special modems at each end, which recognise each others
signals (mutual signal recognition).
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting privileges.
IDS and firewall should be used.
For password rules, see chapter 3.4., User
Identification and Authorisation.
|
TRANSPORT of media
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Loss of confidential or secret information during transport
|
Transport media in sealed envelopes or locked boxes. Cryptography
should be used. |
| Manipulation of media during transport |
As above and:
Electronic seal (cryptologic checksum) on information.
|
| Total loss of media during transport |
Never leave media unattended in cars etc. |
STORE
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information |
Media should be kept in a safe place under lock and key.
'Two-man' rule for access to archives.
|
|
Total loss of information through theft of media
|
Regular back-ups of data and system files are essential.
Together with the logging information, they will provide a comprehensive
security information package. For back-up guidelines, see 3.6. |
| 5.4. Mainframe computer systems |
|
There is normally some kind of access system to a mainframe via terminals or
a number of LANs with workstations, which will be subject to the threats mentioned
above. In that connection, see 5.1. (Architecture-independent
threats), 5.2. (Microcomputer systems), and 5.3.
(Network architectures and mini computer systems), as appropriate.
THREATS
READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Manipulations or unauthorized access to software |
Use separate computers for system/program development
and 'production'.
If possible, restrict access to 'source code',
'compilers' and 'editors' in 'production'
system.
|
|
Unauthorized access to information
|
Users should be given specific written guidelines on what
they should and should not do. Guidelines should be signed for.
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting privileges.
IDS and firewall should be used.
Regularly check logs.
Regularly check that configuration is correct.
|
| Unauthorized access to information
by system administrators, programmers, etc. |
As above and:
Separate test/development systems from production systems.
Restrict access to the computer room. 'Closed shop'
for all other than those working in the computer room.
Restrict use of 'super user'/'root'
privileges.
Cryptography should be used for confidential information.
|
| Corruption of files (program or data) by malicious programs
|
Use 'checksums' on sensitive software to make
it possible to control that it has not been changed deliberately.
Erase all unnecessary codes, default and unused procedures.
|
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information during servicing
|
Servicing of mainframe systems is done 'on site'.
In the case of hardware problems with disk drives they should be replaced
and the faulty ones sent to the vendor for repair, if possible. They can
later be used as replacements, perhaps at another site.
Never send equipment with sensitive information on media
for servicing without a verifiable guarantee that the information will
be destroyed. (It is not enough to 'delete' sensitive information because
of 'undelete' and 'unformat' possibilities).
Cryptography should be used for confidential information.
|
TRANSPORT in Local Area Network (LAN)
TRANSPORT in Wide Area Network (WAN)
TRANSPORT of media
| Threat |
Prevention method |
| Loss of confidential or secret information during transport
|
Transport media in sealed envelopes or locked boxes. Cryptography
should be used for confidential information. |
| Manipulation of media during transport |
As above and electronic seal (cryptologic checksum) on
information. |
| Total loss of media during transport |
Never leave media unattended in cars etc. |
STORE
| Threat |
Prevention method |
Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
|
Media should be kept in a safe place under lock and key.
'Two-man rule' for access to archives.
|
| Total loss of information through theft of media |
Regular back-ups of data and system files are essential.
Together with the logging information, they will provide a comprehensive
security information package. For back-up guidelines, see 3.6. |
| 6. International work groups |
|
|
The European Commission has recognised the need for a comprehensive approach
to information system security to protect the individual, the business community
and public administrations against increasingly sophisticated threats and combinations
of threats.
Consequently, the Commission took the initiative of proposing an overall 'framework'
in which information security problems could be assessed and an appropriate
set of solutions identified and developed.
The evaluation of the security of information systems has been a key activity
with regard to the implementation of a number of the action lines. The European
criteria ITSEC (IT Security Evaluation Criteria), and associated methodology
(ITSEM), has been the subject of many of the INFOSEC projects. The art of US
evaluation criteria (TCSEC, Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria) is
commonly known as the 'Orange Book'. A new standard the CC
(Common Criteria) has been adopted as new international standard and
will replace ITSEC and TCSEC in a period. However, ITSEC and TCSEC will be used
parallel with CC for some time.